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Summary  findings
Go  aramines  the eroding tax base facing transitional  revenue sources. To emphasize  the transitory  nature  and
economnies  by employing a framework  that allows risk  reversibility of the policy recommendation,  import tariffs
factors in assessing tax instruments.  should be implemented  in the  form of a temporary
In an uncertain  world, he asiks,  which  tax instruments  uniform  import surcharge.
should be used? He examines Eastern Europe's  revenue  This conclusion seems to hold whether  the
problem,  including the implications  for public revenue of  government  formulates tax policy with correct or
different  causes of uncertainty-and  investigates which  incorrect expectations.  But the choice of revenue target
taxes are abettert  at generating  revenue. He defines a  matters. All tax instruments will do almost equally well if
'betcer"  tax  as one that has greater stability in a risky  the commonly used tax-to-GDP  ratio is the target.  But it
environment  (that  is, less variation in generating  a target  is a misleading measure since the ratio does not reflect
revenue) and has the  least adverse impact on the  the  immense erosion  of domestic  tax bases in the
economy (for example,  on consumption).  economy and how  real revenue in absolute  level may
Go ernploys the framework  to explain much of the  actually be decreasing rapidly as a result.
output and  revenue fall in transitional economies.  The  The  revenue decline and  uncertainty can also be
terms-of-trade  shocks from the collapse of the CMEA  viewed as a necessity toward  downsizing the larg  e state
trade as well as the rigid but uncertain  cconomic  sector and in redirecting  trade  away from former
responses in transitional  economies are all important  nonmarker  partners. The results emphasize that restoring
factors.  revenue should never lead to maintaining subsidies
The results of his model indicate that import  tariffs are  toward  nonprofitable  state enterprises  or other  public
more effective than  other traditional  tax  instrumcnts in  spending no longer relevant in a market system. Doing so
raising revenue, especially if real revenue is defined in  will only lead to unreasonably  high taxation.
doilar terms  (the price anchor). The contraction  in  No  less important  is moving assets out of collapsing
domestic output and  prices and the devaluation  of the  sectors, privatizing them, and  rmaking  them productive
real exchange rare needed  in the transition  are significant  again.
reasons that  favor imrports as a tax base over other
This paper - a product  of the Public Economics Division, Policy Research Department  - is part of a larger effort in the
department  to develop tools for analyzing tax policy. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818
H StreetNW,  Washington,  DC 204331 Please contact CarlinaJones,  room NIO-063, extension 37699  (37 pages). August
1994.
T7he  Poliy  Research Working Paper Sories disseminates the  findings of  work  n  progress to  cncwage  thc  chan  of ies  abosa
development  issues. An objectie  of  he sries  is to get the fndings out  qukly,  even if the presentaiom  are les  th,an  fidly poishe  T7he
papers cany  the nantes of the authors and shold  be used and citedaccordingly.  The findings, interpretations, and condlusios  are  he
atbhors'  own and should nor be abibured  to the World Bansk.  its Execive  Bod  of Directors, or any of its member countrits
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Revenue Uncertainty  and the Choice of Tax
Instrument  During the Transition In Eastern Europe
Delfin S. Go'
1.  Introduction
As Eastern European economies  undertake reforms on all fronts in their transition  to market-based
systems, their public revenues are not just falling, they are becoming more uncertain. The decline and
increased  uncertainty in revenue have several inter-related  sources, including such factors as fundamental
changes in the structure  of the economies, steep output declines, difficulties in privatizing state entezprises,
the collapse  of traditional export markets, severe terms-of-trade shocks, nascent tax systems and
'Public  Economics  Division, Policy Research Department (PRDPE),  the World Bank. This paper  is part of
PRDPE's  effort to develop tools for analyzing tax policy.  Thanks are due to Shantayanan Devarajan,  Alan Gelb,
and Richard Bird for their valuable comments, to Pekka Sinko for his able assistance  in the numerical
implementation  of the framework,  .md to Shankar Acharya and Christine Wallich for suggesting the topic.administations etc. (See, for example,  Fischer  and Gelb [1990],  Gelb and Gray [1991], and Bruno [1993]).
Inflation and accounting/amortization  rules in the initial phase of reform also affect revenue generation
through their impact  on profits and profit taxes (see Shaffer [19931  for the case of Poland.) Compounding
the revenue  problem is the need to overhaul  the entire tax system. However, introducing a market-based
tax system takes time while governments  critically need revenue to operate in the transition.
In an uncertain world, which tax instrunents should be used?  This paper examines the revenue
problem in Eastern Europe, looks  at the implications  for public revenue  of different causes of uncertainty,
and investigates  which taxes 'better'  at generating revenue. While it is possible to raise revenue from
alterative  tax instrments,  a 'better' tax is defined  as one that has greater stability in a risky environment
(i.e.,  lesser variation in revenue) and smaller adverse impact on the economy (e.g. on consumption).
While firm estimates of revenue are impossible  in economies undergoing fundamental  transformation, it
is important  to understand  how the transition  will affect revenue and how much variation  in tax intake each
factor can generate.
Efforts  to appraise financial  flows  and economic  performance  of these countries  are stymied  by the
lack of reliable data and the practical problem of modifying statistical information not immediately
comparable to those in market economies (see Marer  et. al.  [1992]).  Also, because the underlying
economic  relationships  are changmg  rapidly dunng the transition,  parameters - such as the responsiveness
of import demand and export supplies to terms-of-trade  shocks - are inherently unstable and a range of
possibilities  may exist. In order to produce  plausible illustrations  of the revenue performance, this paper
develops a  simple analytical and accounting framework that imposes little data requirement but also
incorporates the significant  factors of change - such as unpredictable terms-of-trade  shocks and shifting
economic  parameters.
The analysis  bnngs revenue  uncertinty in greater focus much like a financial  appraisal of a risky
Go: Reve  UncrtaiW  2project.  For each set of conditions identified, a risk assessment with a measure of the dispersion and
likelihood  is made regarding what would happen  to public revenue or how high a tax rate would be needed
among alternative  instruments.  Certainly, the usual way of measuring a single revenue potential for each
new tax is inappropriate.  Such an approach assumes  a stable environment,  which is clearly not the casc in
Eastern Europe. In looking at tax policy in transitonal economies, point estimates  of revenue of the most
likely or the best and worst scenarios have a rather small chance of occurring. To determine the rate of
taxation, e.g. a sales tax, what matters is not just the likely tax rate but the variance generated by the
postulated uncertainties.  Where conditions are very risky, the fiscal policy required (e.g.  in choosing
among alternative tax instruments)  to achieve stabilization  and other macro goals may be quite different
from those cases in which revenue circumstances  are more secure.
Among recent studies of Eastern European transitional economies, 2 very few look at temporary
revenue measures. Holzman (1991] addressed public finance issues in a changing political enviromnent,
including transitory tax measures. McKinnon [1991 & 1992] also emphasized  the problem of generating
revenue by looking at temporary measures, including distortionary taxes like import tariffs. This paper
investigates  whether such recommendations  (import tanffs) are supported by a more systematic  revenue
analysis.
The outline of the paper is as follows.  In section  i,  the revenue  performance  in 5 Eastern European
countries  - Bulgaria, former Czechoslovalkia  Hungary, Poland, and Romania  - is briefly reviewed. Taking
the former Czechoslovakia as a case in point, section III descnrbes  the framework and the treatment of
feues  of a transitional  economy  and uncertainty  of public revenue. In section IV, a few simulations are
performed and interpreted. Section  V offers some conclusions  and suggestions for further research.
2Most  studies concentrate  on the practical issues of tax design  without serious revenue analysis. An index of
selected articles, papers and books on trasition  economies is compiled  in a special  issue of Transiion, a
newsletter about reforming economies  published  by the World  Bank.
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2.1.  Public  Revenue
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Figure  1: Revenue  in  Eastern  Europe  (in  constant  1986 prices)
Current  revenues  of governments  in Eastern  Europe, after adjusting  for inflation,  are falling rapidly
(see Figure 1)- In some cases, revenues during this transition can only buy half of what they used to buy
before the collapse of the centrally planned economiesw  As percent of the peak revenue in 1988189,  the
revenue  figures reported in recent years (expressed in constant 1986 prices) are only: 36.9 percent in
Bulgaria  (1992); 64.2 percent in the former Czechoslovakia  (1992); 76.4 percent in Hungary (1991); 50.4
percent in Poland (1991); and 63.2 percent in Romania (1991).
An irnportant reason for the decline in revenue is the collapse of output. The dismantling  of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in Eastem Europe has led to the disappearance of
traditional export markets, while die prices of inputs such as fuel and raw material imports have soared.
The resulting extemal shocks has caused  widespread output  declines (see Rodrik [1993])_
Go: Reene  Uncernainry  4Moreover, while prices have been liberalized  and the subsequent stabilization  efforts have been
impressive,  the structurl change sought in the production  system has been slow. The speed of adjustment
is hampered by  institutional and legal difficulties, such as the privatization of large enterprises, the
introduction of property rights, new accounting system etc.  A slower privatization and structural
adjustment in turn implies that a large segment of supply is unable to respond efficiently to liberalized
prices. Thus, the expanded tax bases promised by a more productive market economy have largely not
been realized (see Sachs [19911  and Zou [1993]).
Figure 2 reports the contraction of the general tax bases, as measured by the gross domestic
product (GDP). Compared to the peak in 1989, real GDP in 1992 has shrunk on average by about a
quarter: 37.5 percent in Bulgaria; 22.6 percent in the former Czechoslovakia;  14.1 percent in Hungary;
18.  1 percent in Poland; and 32.3 percent in Romania. To be sure, the extent of decline of output may be
overstated  because of measurement  problems. It could be claimed that the pre-reform output was largely
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Figure 2: GDP in Easten  Europe (in constant 1986  prices)
Go: Revenue Uncenainry  5inflated while the post-reform production is understated. For example, Berg [1993] estimated that real
output decline in 1990 was more in the range of 7 to 8 percenr rather the official 12 percent in some
countries (a factor of 0.67). Despite the correction  however, this is still a sizable drop for a single year.
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Figure  3: Revenue  Effort  in Eastern  Europe  (revenue  as  percent  of GDP)
While  rae  dishntegrabon  of  ndeitonal  revebaue  bases accounted  for much of the revenue problem,
Vit  did not explain ad . The revenue effort in each country, as measured  by a siscple  ratio of public reveise
to GDP, suggested  a significant  decline in the overlal colection performanc  ae  broken upn  Figure 3). The
co:Rection  rate  fell  rapidly  in a  few  years:  from  60.2  percent  (19  to 34.2  percent  (1992)  in Bulgana;
57.6 percent  Qi988) to 49.5  percent  (1991) in the fonmer Czechoslovalia;  61.5 percent  (1988) to 52.9
percent (1991) in H"gary;  48.0 percent (1988) to 29.2 percent (1991) in Poland; and 51.1 percent (1989)
to 40.1 percent  (1991) in Romania.
The radical change in the underlying tax bases has engendered collection problems in several ways.
Value added of services is nsing as thie  distnbution system is decenttalized.  The scale of enterprises is also
srhdngknk  as the service sector grows and as thie  large socialized  enterprises arc broken up and privatized.
Go.  Renue  Unwrrtainw  6The number of individual tax payers, including  self-enployed entrepreneurs, are therefore multiplying.
These shifts to services, smaller  enterprises, and individual  tax payers will make it generally  harder for the
governments to collect taxes.
Hence, a significant factor is the organization of a new tax administration oriented towards
collecting revenues from numerous private firms and individuals in the transitional economies. This is
necessary  because  market-based  taxes, unlike  previous  differentiated  turnover taxes and discretionary  profit
remittances,  need to be fixed, transparent, and enforceable  on a decentralized market economy. Before
the tax system become fully operative  however, collection efforts suffer. Privatization, which encourages
tax avoidance, also compounds  the problem.
An important source of revenue, profit remittances  from state enterprises, is being replaced by
direct taxes which have uncertain revenue prospects. Where profits used to be transferred completely to
the states in the socialist regime, only a portion can be claimed with the new corporate tax.  Moreover,
profits are falling in the transition  and the share of profits going to interest payments  - generally  not taxed -
may be increasing. In the attempt  to spur the growth of private  firms, governments  in Eastem Europe have
also given generous tax exemptions, e.g. to foreign investors.
The introduction of market-based indirect taxes also has required a shift away from very high
turnover taxes to more reasonable and explicit tax rates.
2.2.  Coglapse  of the CMEA Trade
The disintegration  of exports to the CMEA region and its iinpact on output and public revenue is
an important focus in the analysis. To model it correctly, the extent of decline is briefly reviewed here.
Because  of the problems  of calculating  the right exchange  rates for the CMEA trade,  it has been difficult
Go: Revenue Uncenailny  7to assess the recent historical  export  performance  in Eastern  Europe. Figure 4 shows exports in 5 countries
using preliminary estimates in Marer et. al. [1992] from 1986 to 1990, extrapolated to 1992 using data
from the IMF International  Firance Statistics. These figures are very tentative and should be used with
care, specially the data points of 1991-92.  Nevertheless, it is evident that - there was almost a total
collapse  of exports in Romania  and a huge drop in Bulgaria; a smaller decline is registered in the former
Czechoslovakia  registered; and slightly beter performance were reported in Poland and Hungary.
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Figure  5 displays  the shares of CMEA trade  in  exports.  The shares are generally  and rapidly
declining.  The two countries baving difficulties switching away faom CMEA trade, Romania arxi Bulgaria,
are also the ones experiencing the most difficulties in their total export performance.  'Me share of CMEA
exports still fcll drmatically  in the other  countries:  from 53% to about 5% in the case of Poland, 589%
to 15% in Hungary,  and 60% to 22% in the forFer  Czechoslovakiar 
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Figure 5: Share of CMEA  Trade in the Exports  of Eastern Europe
3.  The Framework
Two elements are important in the analysis. First, given the severe data constraint in Eastern
Europe, the framework (a tax model) needs to be simple in the sense that it makes use only of available
national  income accounts  and revenue  infornation, while  capturing  at t.e same time the minimum,  essential
features of an open economy. The model employed  in this paper is a modified  version of the 1-2-3 general
equilibrium model presented in Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson [1990 and 1993].  It is a simple one-
country, two-activity  and three-commodity  model.  In the original setup, a single open economy engages
in the production of two goods, a pure domestic good and a pure export good, with a constant elasticity
of transformation  between the two.  The domestic  good also competes  with impors in the domestic  market
Go: Revenue Uzceriainry  9but with an elasticity of substitution  that is finite,  The modified version adds features of a transitional
economy (e.g. treatment of CMEA exports) and various taxes into the model. 3
Second, to highlight revenue uncertainty and introduce risk analysis in the simulations,  the
framework  permits the sampling of random variables pertaining to key parameters or exogenous shocks.
The Monte Carlo method (as well as the Latin Hypercube technique) is employed as in Go and Sinko
[1994].4 Using this approach, alternative tax instruments  and their revenue impact, encompassing  many
"what-if" scenarios, can be compared regarding the range of tax rates required - What is the most likely
rate needed? What is the dispersion or variance? What are the relative welfare effects of different taxes?
And what tax policy covers an acceptable  risk?
The salient features of the framework  are discussed  below.  To carry out the model, data from any
Eastern European country may be used. Mainly because of data availability, a Czechoslovakia-like
economy  with 1989  as the base year is employed  for illustrations  (see Table 1). However, the conclusions
are drawn and applied to transitional  economies in general. A list of equations appears in the appendix.
A reference such as 'A2'  means equation '2'  in the list.
3.1.  Production  and CMEA Exports
To account for the importance  of CMEA trade in the framework, gross output in the economy,
GDP, is defined as the sum of exports to the CMEA region, exports to the rest of the world excluding
3Denizer  and Gelb  (1992)  also  use a simple  general  equilibrium  framework  with dualistic  (rural-urban)
structure  to look  at transformnation  issues  in Mongolia.
4Go and Sinko  [1994J  implements  Monte  Carlo  sampling  method  in a simple  tax  model  of an open  economy
(Sri Lanka). A discussion  of the statistical  inference  and confidence  set in the  context  of CGE  models  and
simulations  when  parameters  are uncertain  can  be found  in Abdelkhalek  and Dufour  (1993).
Go:  Revenue  Uncerwainot  10CMEA trade, and domestic  goods (equation  AI).  CMEA  exports, taken as exogenous, are imnportnt  risk
factors subject to uncertain market loss or price collapse.  Their preduction has a set price and a fixed-
coefficient  technology of labor and capital, reflecting  its non-market  nature (equation A2-A3). Net output,
defined  as GDP Ier  CMEA exports, is a CES function  of primary inputs and is dependent on output and
input prices (equation A4-A6).  The production of net output must also be allocated between domestic
goods and  non-traditional exports (rest of the world) based on a constant elasticity of transformation
(equation A8-A10).
In the setup, a fail in CMEA exports releases  labor and will lead to a fall in real wage in order to
maintain  employment (equation  A7). Prices of net output  and domestic  goods will fall.  Net output shifts
outward, absorbing excess labor and increasing  non-traditional  exports (Figure 6).  The extent of the shift
and how much new exports will grow depend on how much of the freed resources are reallocated, the
relative price of domestic goods and exports, and the CET elasticity.  However, even if net output
increases,  GDP may  still fall because  the insalled capital  used in the production  of CMEA  exports is fixed.
D~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Errawj
Figure 6: CET Transfonnation  Between Domestic Goods and Other Exports
Go: Rewene  Uncertainry  11Redistributing  that capital mimnics  the effects of privatizing assets, i.e. making them productive again.'
Alternatively,  it is possible to postulate  that some of the lost output is prolonged  and supported (hoarded?)
by government  out of social concerns,  thus indirectly  subsidizing  wage earners and socialized enterprises
with the prospects of a runaway fiscal deficit.
3.2.  Taxes and The Rest of the Model
Tax revenue consists of the major types of direct and indirect taxes - domnestic  indirect taxes
(sales/exciseNAT),  import tariffs, export  duties,  payroll tax, incone tax on capital and odter income. The
rest  of the framework follows the standard 1-2-3 design.  Imperfect substitution characterizes the
competition between domestic goods and imports. This is reflected in the CES (Armington) function
between  domestic  goods and imports (equation  Al1-A13).  The CMEA shock on the import side may be
addressed  by a rise in import prices. Personal income is the total of factor income (net of tax) from labor
and capital plus transfers from the government and abroad (equation AM4). A simple Keynesian-type
consumption function defines consumption  at market prices (inclusive  of sales tax) as a fixed proportion
of personal income after tax (equation  A15).  Current account balance (equation  A16) is the residual of
imports  less exports at world prices, adjusted  for grants and remittances from abroad. Domestic demand
(equation  A  17) consists  of private consumption,  investment,  and govemment  consumption. Public savings
are endogenously  determined in the government  budget (equation A19) as the balance of tax revenues
(equation  A18)  plus foreign grants (exogenous)  less  government consumption  (exogenous) and tansfer  to
the household (exogenous).  By Walras' law, the savings-investment  identity  (I ! Sp + Sg + Sf) is implied
slf data  are available,  output  can  also  be distinguished  in terms  of socialized  and  private  enterprises  so that  the
effects  of privatization  can be looked  at more  directly. It will  not change  the  qualitative  results  of the  paper
however.
Go: Revenue Unceriainty  12by the above  equations.  Foreign savings  (Sf = eB) are presently  fixed, so that the model is savings-driven. 6
3.3.  Risk Factors
Each uncertainty is defned by a normal probability  distribution, N(p,a,min, max), with mean IA
and standard  deviation  a.? The distribution  is truncated  with a minimum  (mnu)  and a maximum  (nmax)  liiit
to rule out extreme and infeasible  values. Several sources of risk can be defined in the framework:
1) Key  parameters like the trade elasticities: A high CET elasticity, for examnple,  corresponds to
a more responsive and  greater capacity to export when relative puice are more attractive.  The
elasticity of substitution  between domestic goods and imports is another potential risk factor.  A
value of iess than one implies that the real exchange rate will depreciate during an import price
shock so that additional exports are encouraged to pay for tie  more expensive imports.  This is
usually the case in developing countries and may be the case in transitional economies (see
Devarajan et. al. [1993].)
2) Exogenous shocks like the collapse of the CMEA markets and the rise in import prices as
described above.
3) Adjustment cost in moving assets from the declining  sector to the rest of the economy.'
6 The  nominal  exchahg-.  rate (fixed  at 1.00),  hence  implicidy  the world  prices  of foreign  goods,  is the
numeraire  in the  model.
7Other  probability  distributions,  such  as log-normal,  uniform,  poisson,  beta  etc., are also  possible.
'Another  possible  risk factor  is the  colection  problem  associated  with  the  introduction  of market-base  taxes
during  the transition.  This  factor  will  create  a wedge  between  statutory  and effective  taxes  but may  not add  to the
analysis.  For this reason,  it is not included  in the  simulations.  It should  be understood  that  tax rates  in the
simulations  refer  to collection  rates.
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4.1.  Trade  Shocks
The first experiment  deals with two uncertain  trade shocks  - a sharp decline  in CMEA exports and
an increase in import prices.  CMEA exports are expected to decrease from 21 percent of GDP at factor
prices to 10 percent  - a market loss of about half the original size.  This market loss may vary by a
standard  deviation  of 0.025 (1/4 of the expected  value). Its range has arn  upper limit equivalent  to the base
year level (not permitted  to rise) and a lower bound equivalent  to 5 percent of GDP, i.e., N(0. 10, 0.025,
0.05,; 0.21).  Import  prices (base year = 0.95) are expected  to rise by 30% with a maximum  and minimum
gain of 47% and 21%, respectively,  i.e., N(1.24, 0.05, 1.15, 1.40). These shocks  are comparable  to those
observed in the Section 2.2.
In addition to the trade shocks, economic  responses  as defined by the trade and output elasticities
also vary.  The parameters chosen are generally on the low side, reflecting the economic rigidity of a
transitional economy in reallocating resources: the elasticity  of transformation  between domestic goods
and exports is assumed to be N(0.50, 0.02, 0.30, 0.90); the elasticity of substitution  between domestic
goods and imports is defined as N(0.80, 0.02, 0.50, 1.10); and, the elasticity  of substitution  between labor
and capital in net output is N(0.60, 0.02, 0.30, 0.90).
Monte Carlo sampling  is used to draw good distributions  of the risk factors. About 300 iterations
and simulations are made. In each iteration, values of the shocks and parameters are sampled randomly
from the above probability distributions  and a solution is computed. The results for key variables are
reported in Table 2,  which shows their expected  levels, standard  deviations,  and various percentile  values.
The experiment mimics the collapse of CMEA trade in a changing enviromnent. The pattern of
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Flgure  7: Impact  of Trade Shocks  on Output
output and revenue decline in Eastern Europe is duplicated  in Figure 7 and 8, respectively. Real output
is expected  to decline by about  8 % GA).  Tax revenue, on the other hand, is expected  to fall by 22 % (u).9
The effects of uncertainty in the outcomes are reflected in several ways.  A straightforward
statistical interpretation indicate that the risk of output deviating ± 2.2 percentage points {one standard
deviation) around the mean is 68.3 percent.  The chance of output declining  anywhere between 8 to 14
percent (bottom  half of the distribution)  is 50 percent. The average deviation  of the revenue fall is higher
than output. The likelihood  of revenue falling by ± 4.2 percentage  points (la)  around the expectation is
about two-third  and by  ± 8.4 percentage  points (2a) is about 95%.  There is an even risk that tax revenue
rnay fall from 22 to 31 percent.
The scenario above assumes  that real wage is flexible  and labor is free to move from the collapsing
sector to the rest of the economy. This assumption  leads  to the following  - net output will increase by 7.8
percent (p) ±  1.6 percent (a) while exports to non-CMEA  region will rise by as much 21.8 percent (U)
'Tax revenue  is reported  in real terms.  See Section  4.2, Case  I, for definition  and discussion.
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Figure  8:  Impact  of  Trade  Shocks  on  Revenue
±  4.4  percent  (a)-  If the assumption  is to be violated, the rise  in net output and other  exports may  be
reversed;  the fall in GDP  and tax revenue will be much more  than reported.
The scenario assumes conservatively that exports to the CMEA region will shrink by half.  If the
collapse  of the  CMEA  trade  is near total,  the expected fall in real GDP  can reach  18% in magnitude.
Consumption  and  investment  will  contract  on  average  by  16%  and  49%,  respectively.  Such  a  general
breakdown  of  tax  bases  can  lead  to  a 38%  fall  in  tax  revenue.  Hence,  raising  revenue  remains  a  critical
problem  in  transitional  economies.
4.2.  Which  Tax to  Raise?
What  if  the  government  tries  to  raise  or  maintain  revenue?  Which  tax  instrument  is better  in  an
uncertain  world?  The  once-off  systemic  change  in  Eastem  Europe  wil  eventually  require  a new,  market-
based  tax  system.  However,  introducing  a market  system  is  a  slow  process  and  not  all  reforms  can  be
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Because of the serious revenue problem in the transition, governments have to view and sequence
prospective  reforms by their short-term  impact  on revenue  as well. Abstracting  from the institutional  issues
and assuming  that the current revenue structure  can be converted  to market-based  taxes without problems,
this section  examines  three types of taxes -domestic  indirect  tax (e.g. sales/excise/VAT),  import  tariff, and
capital income tax - under three reasonable  possibilities. In the first case, the govermnent  tries to maintain
revenue by fine tuning individual  taxes in response  to the shocks. In the second case, the government has
to set tax policy in advance and guesses  correcdy the distributions  of the shocks  and parameters; however,
it uses an altemative but commonly-used revenue target, the  ax-to-GDP  ratio.  In the third case,  the
government guesses wrong.
Case I:  The Government Maintains Revenue
In an economy experiencing  severe trade shocks, what is the appropriate  revenue target (R)?  The
open-economy  framework  used here takes the nominal exchange rate (er) as the price anchor and defines
real reveeme  as Rler.  Thus, maintaining revenue or equal yield means keeping this ratto constant (at the
base year level). Since the model deals only with relative prices and keeps er fixed (i.e.,  no nominal
inflation), maintaining  revenue should be interpreted to mean that revenue is keeping pace with nominal
devaluations of  the exchange rate.  To compare taxes, a broad  indication of  welfare is aggregate
consumption.  This is because the framework is a static one (no dynamic decision on savings) and all
income (after fixed rates of sales tax and savings)  is consumed  on one aggregate  good.  Investnent, which
is driven by available savings, is also affected by the uncertain pubiic revenue.  The main findings
(presented as  IL  ±  a)  regarding the distribution of tax revenue, consumption, and investment are
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Case I: Maimtaing Revenue
Tax Instrument  Ave.  Tax Rate  Consumption  Inveshnent
1) Dom. Indirect Tax (22.0)'  39.2 ± 4.1  77.5 ± 3.3  80.9 ± 2.6
2) Import Tariff (6.0)'  31.1 ± 6.4  83.4 ±  2.2  71.6±  3.5
3) Capital  Income  Tax (32.0)'  72.8 ± 9.8  73.9 ± 4.5  85.9 ± 2.8
Base-Year  Level  100  100
Wagures in pauhasis  refer  to tax rates  in die base year.
The tax rate needed is quite high for each instrument.  For example, the expected rate of domestic
indirect  taxation  is 39.2 percent (an increase of 78.2 percent); 31.1 percent for import tariffs (an increase
of 4.9 times from the low base); and about 73 percent for capital income tax (an increase of 2.3 times).
The variation around the expected  rate is substantial, ranging from 4.1 to 9.8 percentage points.
The highest  variance is in the capital income  tax, which also has the highest  exected  tax rate.  To be able
to cover 95 percent of the revenue contingencies, the average rate of corporate tax will have to be raised
by two standard  deviation,  which, at the tax rate of 92.4 percent however, is extremely  high. Import taiffs
has the next highest  variance  but the lowest expected  rate.  Even at one standard deviation  higher than the
mean, the average import tariff (at 37.5 percent) is lower than the expected  rate of domestic  indirect  taxes.
Normnally,  one would expect that domestic indirect taxes would be lower because of the broader base in
the domestic market.  Here,  a 40 percent sales/VAT rate, or the 47 to 50 tax needed for a 95 percent
likelihood, is very high indeed.
I"Table  3 to 5 in the appendix  present  the reslts in greater  details.
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consumption,  followed  by domestic indirect  taxes, and capital  income taxes."  The impact  on investment,
on the other hand, is the reverse of consumption  because, in part, with less  consumption more savings are
invested. The effects  on revenue and consumption  seem  to suggest  that import tariffs are good temporary
tax measures. Such a recommnendation  is made by McKinnon [199  1.  If collection problems are allowed
to raise the nominal rates,'2 McKinnon's suggestion of a cascading tariff with a top rate of 100 percent,
to be gradually  brought down to a uniform and low rate over 5 years, seems within range and reasonable.
The pattern of results points to tax issues peculiar to transitional economies.  Two factors are
critical:  the trade shocks and the choice of Armington elasticity.  The collapse of the CMEA exports
reduces the base of domestic taxation by its deflationary impact on output, domestic prices, and factor
prices.  Tile import price shock when combined  with an Anmington  elasticity  of less than one (because of
its plausibility in transitional economies) also tends to  reinforce this effect. Figure 9,  for example,
ilustrates  the impact of a  10% import price shock on the rate of change in domestic prices,  PD.,  with
altemative Annmington  elasticity, a,  and CET elasticity, a, in a 1-2-3  framework.' 3 The f'all  in domestic
prices relative to world prices is an indication that the real exhange rate must fall in the transition so that
output switching can occur and non-CMEA exports can be pushed while keeping the current account
balance  from deteriorating. Under the circumstances, import tariffs are favored to maintain real revenue
"Although  strictly  not comparable,  the average  consumption  in simulation  1 (the  no tax case)  is 88.3 with  a
standard  deviation  of 1.4.
12[t is possible  to add less  than 100  percent  collection  rates  for various  taxes  in the framework.  This may
change  the nominal  rates  of taxes  but will  not affect  the  results.
'3Disregarding  xaxes,  the  underlying  relationship  is 45D  =  *  '  (.-1)  ,  where  is the  change  in import
prices.  See Devarajan,  Lewis,  and Robinson  (1990  & 1993)  for the  algebraic  derivation  and  discussion.
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Figure 9:  Import Price Shock, Trade Elasticities,  and Domestic  Prices
defined in dollar terms (price anchor).  The traditional corporate tax base, i.e., profits of state-owned
enterprises,  is shrinkdng  so rapidly that any attempt to restore revenue from this source will require
excessive taxation.  Likewise, the fall in output and domestic prices dininishes the revenue potential of
domestic indirect  taxes. Moreover, import tariffs  provide  at the margin some protection of factor income
from the contractionary  impact of trade shocks; hence,  it will allow for greater consumption  relative to
domestic taxes, which either reduce consumption  directly  (direct  taxes) or indirectly  by increasing the cost
of consumption (domestic indirect taxes).
The above result is striking  in the sense that, witlout bringing in the issue of administrative  ease,
imports tariffs are still favored because of the type of shocks and trade elasticities postulated in the
transition. Note that this is not an argument for imposing  high and permanent import tariffs, which have
become synonymous  with excessive  protection, inefficient  production, and rent-seeking  behavior.  In the
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more  responsively  to price  signals,  can  expand  rapidly.  In that  situation, domestic  taxes  will tend  to have
a broader base and  greater efficiency  in generating  revenue. Until  the immense  erosion  of domestic  tax
bases are reversed,  however,  irnport  tariffs  a :1  play  a vital role.
Case II:  The Government Guesses Correctly
In this experiment,  the govermnent  needs  to prepare  tax legislation  in advance  but does so with
correct  expectations.  Tax policy,  which  can  only  be defined  once  and at a single  rate, is set  at the expected
values  of the shocks  and  parameters.  However,  there  are risks  around  the expected  shocks  and  parameters.
The issue  is whether  such  variation  may  generate  effects  that  favor  certain  taxes: some  taxes may  be more
stable (e.g. in revenue);  the expected  revenue  may be different  whet risks are introduced  (i.e., the
relationships  are highly  non-linear.)  In addition,  the  government  looks  at another  revenue  target,  the tax-
to-GDP  ratio, and  plans  to raise  the ratio  by 5 percentage  points  from  59.2  percent  in the  base  year  to 64.2
percent.  Using  expected  values of the shocks  and parameters  as defined  in Section  4.1,  the tax rate
required  are as foliows:  domestic  indirect  taxes  need  to be changed  from 22.0% in the base  year to 25.7
%; importtriffs,from6.0%  tol3.5%;  capitalincometax,  from31.7%to40.3%.  Fixingeachnew
tax ruxe  in turn, the risk factors  are introduced  altogether  and simulations  are conducted  repeatedly  using
Monte  Carlo sampling.
The results, shown  below,  indicate  that  consumption  is slighdy  higher in the import-tariff  case.
Hence, investment  is also less with reduced  savings  when  compared  to the other  two tax instruments.
However,  the differences  are numerically  small.  This  is also  true the revenue  target  - the tax/GDP  ratio.
The results  are generally  stable  when  the Monte  Carlo  sampling  is increased  from 300  to 500 iterations.
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not matter which tax instnrment is chosen.
Case 13:  The Government  Guesses  Correctly
Tax Instrument  TaxzGDP  Consumption  Invesament
1)  Dom. Indirect  Tax  64.69 ± 0.15  85.71 ± 1.36  69.38 ± 4.38
2) Import  Tariff  64.25 ± 0.19  86.58 ± 1.36  67.89 ± 4.23
3) Capital  Income  Tax  64.23 ± 0.18  85.21  ±  1.37  69.98 ± 4.44
Memo:  Base-Year  Level  59.24  100  100
However, the tax-to-GDP  ratio is a misleading  revenue target when the tax base is shrinkdng. In
fact,  real revenue as measured by Rev/er  is (82.8 ± 4.1) for domestic indirect taxes, (85.0 ± 4.6) for
import tariffs, and (82..8 ± 4.4) for capital income tax.  While the increased tax efforts as measured by
the tax-to-GDP  ratios are attained, real revenue levels in terms of Rev/er  are significantly  below the base-
year 100 but higher than the 78.14 in the no tax policy case in Section 4.1.  Moreover, import tariffs still
appear better in generating  real revenue. On the other hand,  if Revler is the target instead  and held fixed,
the tax-to-GDP ratios will vary.  Hence, it does matter which revenue target is used.
Case  ll:  The Government is Overly Optimistic
Achieving  a particular tax-to-GDP  ratio or a real revenue target as in Case II requires absolutely
correct expectations  - not just of real GDP,  but also about the external shocks, the responsiveness  of the
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foreign goods), and various components  of GDP that utimately  determine  revenue  generation  by individual
tax instruments. This is often a heroic assumption. Governments in Eastern Europe are confronted by
pressing  reforms in all fronts and are just learning  GDP accounting  properly. What if simplistic  and wrong
assumptions are made in the budgetary preparations? Do  import tariffs minimize the downside risks
relative to other taxes?
Take the case in which the government anticipates  the external shocks correctly but the economy
is less responsive that what government originally expected.  In particular, Case II is repeated: the
governmet  fonnulates the same tax policy  given  the same expectations  about the shocks and parameters;
however, except for the Armington  elasticity,  all expectations  are correct; the correct Armington  elasticity
is only half of what is anticipated and has greater standard deviation. i.e.,  a is changed from N(0.80,
0.02, 0.50, 1.10) to N(0.40, 0.05, 0.25, 0.90).  The results are sununarized  as follows:
Case  m: The Government  is Overly  Optimistic
Tax Instrument  Tax/GDP  Rev/er  Consumption  Investment
1) Dom. Indirect Tax  65.21 ± 0.29  72.51 ± 4.84  83.99 ±  1.64  65.12 ± 5.25
2) Import Tariff  64.23  ±  0.20  74.62 ± 4.81  84.51 ±  1.78  64.26  ±  5.38
3) Capital  Income Tax  65.28 ± 0.32  72.08 ± 4.80  83.49 ±  1.61  65.83 ±  5.30
Memo: Base-Year  Level  59.24  100  100  100
The tax-to-GDP  ratios are similar  to those in Case II. The results suggest  that the target of raising
the ratio by 5 percentage points is sdll achievable  and appear comparable for altemative tax  instruments.
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economy.  Real  revenues  in fact  are now  all lower  than  in Case 11. Morever, import  taxes  still do better.
Consumption  levels  are also  down  but less  with imports.  Investment,  driven  by savings,  have  the revcrse
story like  in Case  II. In all variables,  the risks  or standard  deviations  are higher.
Another  source of possible  error is the government's  forecasts  about the external  shocks. For
example,  if die  collapse  of the  CMEA  exports  and the  rise in import  prices  turn out  to be higher,  e.g. near
80% and 60%, respectivcly  (instead  of the  projected  50%  and 30%, respectively)  and everything  else the
same  as above, real  revenue  will  fa  ll to much  lower  levels  but with less  decline  in the import-tariff  case:
59.1 in the domestic  indirect  tax case; 61.4, import  tariffs; 59.2, capital  income  tax.
4.3.  Downsizing  the State Sector
The simulations  so far sidestrack  some  fundamental  questions  - Whether  public  expenditures  in
transitional  economies  are already  'optimal'? Whether  they  should  be at all Financed  by high taxes? And
whether  other  measures,  such  as privatization,  will  help? These  issues  are examined  next.
The extremely  high tax-to-GDP  ratios resulting  from keeping the current revenue structure
instandy  confirm  that  tax policy  should  never  be divorced  from the expenditure  fimction  of government.
As the former  socialist  countries  move  towards  market-oriented  economies,  public  expenditures  also need
to be examined,  cut  back, and restructured. Any  attempt  to finance  current  levels  is not sustainable  and
will only  lead  to reasonably  high  taxes, as demonstated  above. One  single  item  like  government  transfers
and subsidies,  for example,  can take up 45 % of gross  value added  at factor  prices (see Table 1.) Just
eliminating  a third  of the  revemne  demanded  for that  item  alone,  even  while  giving  up non-tax  revenue,  will
reduce  the required  tarff rate in Case I from 31.1 % to a much  lower  85%.
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Figure  10: Expected  hnport Tariff Rate  with Privatization
No less important is to move assets out of the collapsing  sector, privatizing and makng them
productive again (see, for example,  Blanchard et. at. [1991]). The next experiment  shows that even if
there are substantial  but uncertain  adjustment  costs in the order of 25 % with a standard  deviation  of 10
%, the benefits of 'privatizing' assets  quickly  are still substntial (at least the portion associated  with the
output loss). Tne resulting  expansion  of the market base will reduce the imposition  of additional  taxes. 1"
Looking at the tariff instrument again, Figure 10 shows the distribution of the tax rate with such a
privatization  scheme; the average rate falls to 27.3 percent. It should  be recalled that the stardtin point
of this result is the expecttion that the CMEA market  will shrink  by only 50 percent. a very conservative
scenario. If the loss is total and if, in addition, a significant  portion of output from socialized  enterprises
cannot be sold in the domestic  market, then the gains of privatization  will considerably  be more. Since
14It  is entirely  possible  that  privatization  will  not lead  to an expnasion  of the  tax base  initially  because  of
collection  and  evasion  problems.  Such  possibility  reemphasizes  the need  for temporay  tax  measures  like an import
surcharge.
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on public finance further make the issue of reducing  the state sector critical.
5.  Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to formulate  a framework for making  revenue assessments  and for
examining  altemative  tax instruments  in a changing  environment. The model is used to explain much of
the output  and revenue  faU  in transitional  economies. The terns-of-trade shocks from the collapse of the
CMEA trade as well as the rigid but uncertain economic responses in transitional economies are all
important  factors.
nsofar  as a new tax system will  take time to institute  and  revenue  is critical in the transition, the
results indicate that import tariffs are more effective ;ian  other traditional tax instruments in raising
revenue, especially if real revenue is defined in dollars terms (the price anchor).  The contraction in
domestic output and prices and the devaluation  of the real exchange rate needed  in the transition are
significant  reasons  that favor imports  as a tax  base over other revenue  sources. To emphasize  the ransitory
nature and reversibility  of the policy recommendation, import  tariffs should  be implemented  in the form
of a temporary, uniform, import surcharge.
The above conclusion  seems to hold whether  the government  formulates  tax policy with correct
or incorrect expectations. The choice of revenue target, however, matters. All tax instruments  will do
almost equally well if  the commonly  used tax-to-GDP  ratio is the target.  It is a misleading  measure,
however, since the ratiD  does not reflect  the immense  erosion of domestic  tax bases in the economy  and
how real revenue in absolute level may actually  be decreasing  rapidly as a result.
The revenue problem and uncertainty  can also be viewed as a necessity  towards downsizing  the
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former non-market  partners.  Hence, the results emphasized  that restoring revenue should never lead to
maintaining subsidies towards non-profitable  state enterprises or other public expenditures no longer
relevant  in a market system. Doing so will only lead to unreasonably  high taxation. The outcome hinted
at the importance  of privatization  in expanding  the tax base and reorienting  or cutting public expenditures.
Furthermore, policy uncertainty,  i.e., the likelihood  of success (or reversal)  and the credibility  of reform,
although  not examined  here, is an important  risk hctor by itself. Some  of these issues  are best investigated
firther in a dynamic  stochastic  framework. Future research  will  examine  policy  uncertainty, privatization,
and the likelihood  of refbrm success as determinants  and risk facwrs in investment  and growth.
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Go:  Reweme  Unrertainy  29Bil. Kcs.  Output=1  Si1.  Kcs.  Output = 1
1  NatIonal Accounts  3  Fiscal Account
Output  (Value Added)  840.46  1.00  Revenue  484.10  0.58
Wages  479.06  0.57  NonTax  37.90  0.05
Current Expenditure  443.90  0.53
GDP at  market prices  977.76  1.16  Goods & Services  253.94  0.30
Private Consumption  390.14  0.46  Interest Payments  22.07  0.03
Public Consumption  253.94  0.30  Transfers & Subsidies  167.93  0.20
Investment  292.00  0.35  Capital  Expenditure  61.60  0.07
Exports  371.25  0.44  Fiscal Balance  -21.40  -0.03
Imports  329.57  0.39
2  Tax Revenue  4  Balance of  Payments
Sales & Excise Tax  125.80  0.15  Exports  - Imports  41.68  0.05
Import Tariffs  11.50  0.01  Net Prafits & Dividends  0.00  0.00
Export  Duties  0.00  0.00  Interest  Paymrents  0.00  0.00
Payroll Tax  107.20  0.13  Net Private Transfers  0.00  0.00
Personal Income Tax  59.00  0.07  Net Offidal  Transfers  -14.91  -0.02
Capital Income Tax  137.00  0.16  Current Account  Balance  26.77  0.03
Total  440.50  0.52
Extemal Debt  324.52  0.39
Debt  Service Payments  50.03  0.06
Table 1: Data of the Former Czechoslovakia,  1989
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Slmulatlon  Sta2433.0s  5%f.ls4  Year =  .00%J
IterNtions:  300
Variabl0:  GDP  Exports  Domestl0  Imports  N.t  Consump-  Inv0st-  Tax
Pothea)  Good  Output  tlon  mant  Revenue
Minnum=  86.80%  109.35%  100.63%  56.03%  102.91%  84.70%  54.95%  68.83%
Poximum-  97.7E%  133.12%  103.69%  73.98%  105.96%  91.93%  76.77%  90.71%
Mean=-  92.12%  121.83%  102.24%  62.09%  107.60%  88,27%  65.82%  78.15%
Std D90aton  2.17%  4.37%  0.43%  3.70%  1.56%  1.375%  462l%  4.17%
Variance  - 0.05%  0.19%  0109%  60.14%  0.02%  8.05%  05189%  0.17%
skownessr  94.07.%  -11.62%  *41.49%  11.34%  -26.86%  7.2%  -7.88%  75.6ff
kurtosh  - 298.57%  276.29%  327.32%  2601.11%  275.40%  278.18%  255.80%  278.351%
Percentile  Valuos
UPerc=  9  88.39%  114.35%  101.24%  56.70%  104.96%  86.03%  59.13%  71.38%
1OPerc  - 89.23%  116.409%  101.69%  57.89%  1M7.75%  86.39%  60.02%  72.84%
16Perc=  89.79%  117.37%  101.79%  56.910%  106.01%  86.815%  61.15%  73.84%
2OPerG-  90.19%  118.24%  101.85%  59.54%  1068.7%  87.05%  62.06%  74.38%
2SPerc=  90.52%  _  123.95%  101.96%  60.03%  108.64%  87.35%  62.95%  74.97%
3OPerjc=  90.91%  119.62%  102.04%  60.53%  106.88%  87.52%  63.B1%  75.69%
3SPerc  - 91.30%  120.20%  102.09%  60.98%  107.10%  87.70%  64.10%  76.51%
4OPerc=  91.59%  120.66%  102.15%  61.33%  107.33%  87.82%  64.53%  76.99%
45Pere-  91.88%  121.27%  102.24%  62.01%  107.34%  88.04%  75.10%  77.41%
50Aerc  =  92,22%f  121.93%  102,28%  82.55%  107.75%  38.31%e  65.73%  77.88%
65perc =  92.40%  122.83%6  102.33%  63.07%  107.95%  838.50%  66.57%  78.47%
60Pe,rc-  92.71 %  123,03%  102.40%  83.66ff  108.14%  88.63%  67.01 %  79.06%
65Perc  - 92.999%  123.52%  102.43%  64.18%  lOB.35%  8B.83%  67.45%  79.53%
70Perc  - 93.38%  124.26%  i02.47S6  64,73%  108.56%  89.08%  68.42%  80.34%
7SPOer  - _  M64%  125.13%  102.53%  65.36%  1  OB.80%  89.24%  68.94% _  80.82%
BOPerc =  93.B9%  1256.4%  102.81  %  B5.93%  109.04%  89.52%  691.70%  81.649%
8bBerc  s  94.40%  128.33%  102.88%  66.69%  109.34%  89.65%  70.11%  82.43%
90Perc  =  94.92%  127.39%  102.76%  67.26%  109.68%  80.05%  71.25%  83.55%
95Petr-  95,61%  128.97%  102.88%  69.14%  110.12%  90.51 %  72.72%  85.28%
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Simulation  Statist/cs  (Base  Year  - 100%  except Sales Taxi
Iterations: 300
Varable:  GDP  Nat  Exports  Domestic  Imports  Consump-  Invest-  PD  Sales  Tax
Output  Good  tion  ment  Rats
MlnImum-  86.83%  10.67%  109.03%  100,34%  52.66%  69.o5%  73.34%  60.13%  28.05%
Mexsmumn-  98.01%  129.89%  132.59%  103.34%  74.39%  87,39%  85.97%  85.07%  50.16%
Mean  92.12%  120.72%  121.80%  102.27%  62.71%  77.46%  80.88%  70.69%  39.25%
Std  Deviation  =  2.14%  3.78%  4.29%  0.44%  3.66%  3.32%  2.57%  4.58%  4.15%
Variance-  0.05%  0.14%  0.18%  0.00%  0.13%  0.11%  0.07%  0.21%  0.17%
ISkowness-  -2.71%  -19.92%  -15.62%  56.69%  3.52%  8.34%  30.10%  33.75%  3.60%
Kurfosls  =  261.41%  279.59%  274.53%  382.59%  289.08%  277.06%  273.B6%  292.56%  267.23%
Percentile  Values
SPare-  88.4696  114.15%  114.64%  101.49%  56.82%  71.97%  76.24%  63.15%  32.35%
10Perc=  89.23%  115.55%  116.26%  101.69%  57.83%  73.17%  77.57%  64.89%  33.80%
75Perc =  89.S2%  116.76%  116.98%  101.82%  58.84%  74.01%  78.18%  65.92%  34.83%
2OPera  - 90.26%  117.55%  118.10%  101.90%  59.63%  74.38%  78.67%  66.98%  35.79%
25Perc  =  90.70%  118.08%  118.87%  102.00%  60.01%  75.22%  7S.12%  67.56%  36.27%
3OPerc=  90.93%  118.61%  119.41%  102.06%  80.53%  75.60%  79.40%  68.07%  36.90%
35Perc=  91.28%  119.43%  120.29%  102.15%  81.23%  76.15%  79.84%  68.91%  37.65%
4OPerc-  91.55%  119.98%  120.91%  102.21%  61.79%  76.45%  80.29%  69.20%  39.18%
4SPerc =  91.87%  120.52%  121.45%  102.27%  62.20%  76.99%  80.63%  69.66%  38.64%
SOPero-  92.11%  121.04%  121.97%  102.30%  62.71%  77.50%  81.03%  70.18%  39.37%
5SPerc=  92.43%  121.45%  122.51%  102.37%  63.31%  77.76%  81.32%  70.76%  39.73%
6OPerc=  92.68%  121.85%  122.86%  102.41%  63.64%  77.98%  81.68%  71.50%  40,23%
6SPerc-  93.06%  122.08%  123.50%  102.45%  64.26%  78.65%  82.05%  72.13%  40.92%
7OPerc  m  93.37%  122.80%  124.03%  102.50%  84.90%  79.43%  82.43%  73.08%  41.35%
75Pero=  93.58%  123.21%  124.72%  102.56%  66.24%  79.92%  82.71%  73.79%  42.01%
80Pero =  93.95%  123.79%  125.54%  102.64%  65.96%  80.25%  83.02%  74.43%  42.52%
BSPerc=  94.40%  124.55%  126.06%  102.71%  68.38%  7  80.98%  83.60%  75.45%  43.88%
9OPerc - 94.91%  125.41%  127.46%  102.80%  67.08%  81.88%  84.25%  77.03%  44.61%
9SPerc  =  95.59%  126.77%  128.74%  102.93%  68.53%  82.73%  84.98%  78.69%  46.37%
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Simulaion Statlaslcs  103se  Year - 100% except Tariff Rate)
Iterations:  300
Variable:  GDP  Not  Output  Exports  Domestle  Imports  Consump-  Invest-  Tariff
Goods  tion  ment  Rate Minimum-  89.12%  103.28%  107.68%  101.81%  51.08%  78.18%  63.41%  15.23%
MaXImum=  97.62%  110.99%  124.25%  108.72%  70.77%  88.90%  79.59%  48.39% Mean=-  93.15%  107.74%  116.42%  104.64%  60.35%  83.41%  71.63%  31.07  %
SWjDevatZon=  1.75%  1.65%  3.17%  0.96%  4.0B%  2.22%  3.49%  6.37% Vrlrancea=  0.03%  0.02%  0.10%  0.0196  0.16%  0.05%  0.12%  0.41%
Skewness-  -4.35%  .19.30%  -4.12%  -31.78%  16.34%  2.72%  .15.55%  16.98% lKursoshJ-  248.29%  259.58%  258.70%  277.07%  251.08%  250.25%  244.64%  250.E0% Percenlile  Values
5Parc=  90.03%  105.04%  111.27%  102.95%  63.59%  79.69%  6S.44%  21.32% lOPerc-  S0.75%  106.64%  112.20%  103.26%  55.13%  80.57%  E6E.56%  22.70% 75Porc-  91.17%  106.03%  112.84%  103.66%  66.84%  81.12%  67.68%  24.05% 2OPerc=  91.59%  106.38%  113,45%  103.77%  56.87%  81.40%  68.66%  25.22% 25Perc=  91.88%  106.63%  114.05%  103.98%  57.33%  81.77%  69.21%  26.37% 3OPerc-  92.19%  106.89%  114.80%  104.17%  57.91%  82.12%  69.72%  27.32%
35Perc-  92.f0%  107.19%  115.17%  104.34%  58.43%  82.44%  70.27%  28.47% 4oPetc-  92.73%  107.40%  116.711%  104.48%  59.26%  82.83%  70.72%  29.00% 45Perc=  92.96%  107.60%  116.05%  104.62%  59.60%  83.12%  71.23%  29.78% 6OPeor-  93.16%  107.78%  116.37%  104.68%  60.09%  83.44%  71.70%  30.81%
65Perc-  s3.38%  107.97%  116.88%  104.80%  60.62%  83.67%  72.11%  31.41% 60Pe,c=  93.63%  109.13%  117.19%  104.92%  61.32%  84.01%  72.46%  32.62% 65Porc=  93.86%  108.41%  117.65%  105.05%  61.84%  84.25%  73.19%  33.26%
7OPorc-  94.12%  108.E3%  118.02%  105.18%  6i.35ff  84.60%  73.92%6  34.42%
75Pero-  94.43%  108.83%  118.58%  105.32%  63.18%  84.92%  74.37%  35.25% 8OPere-  94.71%  109.07%  119.21%  105.45%  63.93%  85.30%  74.64%  36.63% p6re  =  95.06%  109.45%  119.88%  105.55%  64.83%  85.91%  75.41%  37.80%
19OPorc-  95.46%  109.74%  120.81%  105.8B%  65.69%  8B.50%  76.04%  39.73%
9SPerc - 95.89%  110.24%  121.42%  106.14%  67.19%  87.03%  76.95%  42.48%
Page  33Table 5: Raising Revenue from Capital Income Tax (Revenue-Neutral Simulation)
Simuladron  Statistics  (Base  Year  - 100%  except  CapitalIncome  Tax  - tkl
Iterations: 300
Variabl:  GDP  Exports  Domeatlo  Imports  Not  Consump-  Invest-  PD  tk
Good  Output  tion  ment
Minfmum=  86.95%  109.95%  100.71%  53.02%  103.15%  63.44%  76.72%  60.51%  48.69%
MAxlmum=  97.51%  131,65%  103.18%  73.24%  110.95%  85.14%  92.27%  83.99%  95.19%
Mean-  92.11%  121.82%  102.24%  62.82%  107.68%  73.93%  85.8E%  70.58%  72.75%
Std DaviatIon_  2.17%  4.39%  0.40%  3.81%  1.55%  4.47%  2.77%  4.78%  9.80%
Variance  =  0.05%  0.19%  0.00%  0.15%  0.02%  0.20%  0.08%  0.23%  0.98%
Skewness-  *6.17%  .12.58%  *59.99%  .1.45%  .25.07%  0.04%  -41.01%  27.83%  7.02%
Kurtoul =  253.63%  2M3.52%  382.34%  278.36%  271.75%  260.68%  310.90%  276.97%  258.04%
Percentile  Values
5Perc=  88.39%  114.32%  101,58%  56.62%  105.01%  86.07%  80.87%  63.09%  56.73%
lOPerc_  89.13%  116.27%  101.71%  57.82%  105.62%  87.78%  82.24%  64.13%  60.29%
16Perc=  89.74%  117.10%  101.85%  58.85%  106.03%  68.85%  83.00%  65.11%  62.04%
2OPerc  90.20%  118.15%  101.92%  69.58%  106.36%  70.03%  83.53%  66.44%  64.26%
2SPew=  980.87%  118.89%  ¶02.00%  60.29%  106.64%  70.95%  84.01%  67.17%  66.07%
3OPe,a=  90.94%  119.47%  102.08%  60.81 %  105.89%  71.49%  84.36%  67.95%  67.05%
35Perc=  91.27%  120.19%  102.13%  61.34%  107.12%'  72.27%  85.04%  68.70%  68.44%
40Po,c=  91.60%  1  20.58%  102.16%  61.E6%  107.33%  72.76%  85.42%  69.06%  69.81%
45Perc-  91.86%  121.19%  102.23%  62.24%  107.53%  73.23%  95.79%  69.66s%  70.83%
6OPerc-  92.10%  121.99%  102.28%  62.71%  107.74%  74.09%  86.21%  70.40%  72.44%
65Perc  =  92.46%  122.56%  102.32%  63.39%  107.93%  74.68%  86.50%  71.02%  73.78%
6OPerc-  92.70%  122.99%  102.35%  63.72%  108.14%  76.19%  86.78%  71.75%  74.88%
66Perc  - 93,06%  123.65%  102.44%  64.46%  108.34%  75.91%  87.08%  72.44%  76.31%
7OPerc-  93.34%  124.12%  102.47%  64.96%  108.56%  76.43%  67.38%  73.07%  78.12%
75Percx  93.60%  124.93%  102.52%  65.49%  108.80%  76.81%  87.81%  73.65%  79.27%
OOPere_  94.03%  125.46%  102.57%  61.95%  109.05%  77.62%  88.24%  74.12%  81.40%
86'perc-  - g4.35%  126.67%  102.62%  66.97%  109.32%  78.52%  88.69%  75.69%  83.38%
9OPerc=  94.85%  127.71%  102.73%  67.63%  109.67%  79.58%  89.21%  76.65%  85.82%
96Pe,re  95.58%  129.19%  102.80%  69.95%  110.17%  91.51  90.29%  79.11%  89.00%
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A.l.  Equations of the Model
(1) GDP  (7) Labor  Market
Y Y  Px  X  + Pl1+a)t  Lx + LF u L
(2) CMEA  Exports  k  (8)  CET  Transformation
Ir
9(1+a)  = miz(aLL4,  UEKO  X  =  t,[  EPt +
(3) Cost  of  (9) EJD  Rabo
Pt (1  +  = PL  LE +  rK  E  =  _  _E_+P,
(4)  Net  Output  X  (10) Net Output  Pnce
x =~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  x  =a  PC +  P-1P  Z)  9px  =PEX~  + PD°X
(5) Factor  Demand  in  X  (11)  Supply  of Goods
K,_  pi,  V,L 
LK  [(1-I3;J 1 Q =  4M  ,pP  +  (I-PP)D
(6) Cost of X  (12) M/D  Ratio
L  K,  =  __rPq p  =  p  r  +  r-  D  Lp
LX  rx  D  [(1-PPMJ
Go:  Reenue  Uncerainiy  35(13) Supply  Pnce  (18) Tax  Revenue
Rep =tm  hcm  Mer
D  M  +  te(P/z+P4)  +  PQ Q P  Q  =PM  + t  PL  L  + tk rr  Kr
+ tk rfKC  +  ty  Y
(14) Personal  Income  (19) Govemment  Budget
Y,  =  Px(l-t)LS
+ (rA=+rK)(I-tk)  S  = Rcv - PQ(1+erG
+flP  +flgr  - TR  PQ - uPzg + FT  er
(15) Personal  Consumpton  (20)  Prce Indices
.YN(1_N')  Pr =(I (l)Px  X  APC
I  =  PQ(1 +ts)  PM  h  '(1  b)r
p  =E
PE  Il+tC
(16)  Current  Account  Balance  p  =  E
B  =  SCMM  - E  E
-1E-FT  -RE
(21) Capital  Stocks
(17) Domestc  Demand
K,  =KO4)
Q  = Ct  + I  + G  K  = KE +  (I-O)(  KO^  - K)
Go:  Rae  Unceawrbs  36A.2.  Parameters  & Scalars  A.3.  Variables
Uq  - shift  parameter  In  0  CN  - consumption
at  - shift  parameter  In CET
ax  - shift  parameter  In  X  D  domestic  good
Pq  share  parameter  In  Q
,  - share  parameter  In  CET  E  - export  good
13.  - share  parameter  In  X
B  - current  account  balance  I  - investment
CS  - expenditure  share
4  - exports  to the  CMEA  KI  - capital  in
region
er  - exchange  rate  Kx  - capital  in X
FT  - foreign  transfers  to government
G  - govemment  consumption  Le  - labor  demand  in  E
KOt  - base  year  capital  in  t
KOx  - base  year  capital  in  X  Lx  - labor  demand  in  X
L  - labor  supply
A  - weight  of CMEA  exports  M  - import  good
pq  - exponent  in 0
pt  - exponent  in CET  P  - price  of CMEA  exports
p,  - exponent  in  X
RE  - remittances  from  abroad  to  PE  - price  of  other  exports
households
Rev  - tax  revenue  PM  - import  price
u  - production  support  from
govemment  Po  - domestic  price
a  - adjustment  cost
te  - export  duty  P,  - wage
tk  - tax  on  capital  income
XI  - paroll  tax  Po  - supply  price
tn  - import  duty
ts  - saleslexcise  tax  Px  - net  output  price
ty  - tax  on  personal  income
TR  - transfers  from  govemment  to  Py  - GDP  deflator
households
nk  - world price of CMEA  exports  Q  - supply
rE  - world  price  of other  exports
nM  - world  price  of imports  r,  - return  to K,
rx  - return  to Kx
Sg  - govemment  savings
X  - net  output
Y  - GDP
YH  - personal  income
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